Defence Minister Margarita Robles and Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska have given completely different accounts of what the Spanish government knew ahead of the mass migration movement towards Ceuta. While Robles says the CNI intelligence service had already warned on 29 July of a possible attempt to enter the enclave, Marlaska denies that there was any report warning of an impending mass arrival.
Spain Expat Press Editorial Team
by Marlon Gallego Bosbach
The political fallout from the serious migration crisis in Ceuta has sparked an open conflict within the Spanish government. At the centre of the dispute is the question of whether the Spanish authorities had concrete indications of what was about to happen before tens of thousands of people arrived in the enclave on 30 July.
On Tuesday, Defence Minister Margarita Robles told the Spanish parliament that Spain’s intelligence service, the CNI (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia), had already been informed on 29 July of a possible attempt to enter Ceuta. The information was shared with and analysed by the security forces and the Spanish government’s delegation in Ceuta.
However, Interior Minister Fernando Grande-Marlaska contradicted this account later the same day. He said there had been no report from the CNI or any other intelligence service indicating that a mass movement on this scale was likely to take place on 30 July.
Robles: CNI had informed the authorities a day earlier
According to Robles, the CNI received information on 29 July about a mobilisation. This involved calls for people to swim to Ceuta the following day. The Defence Minister stressed that intelligence information did not necessarily have to be communicated in the form of a detailed written report. In particular, sensitive intelligence could also be shared verbally.
According to Robles, however, the information available was not withheld. The CNI shared its findings with the relevant security authorities and analysed them jointly with them. In doing so, the minister explicitly defended the work of Spain’s intelligence service. She also pointed out that the CNI has around 25 staff in Ceuta, where they regularly gather information on potential security risks.
Marlaska contradicts: No warning of a mass movement
Interior Minister Marlaska subsequently presented a very different account of the situation. According to him, there had been no report predicting that a mass movement on the scale that ultimately took place would occur on 30 July. This applied not only to the CNI, but also to other Spanish and European intelligence services.
Marlaska also stressed that Spain’s intelligence services had performed an excellent job. There had indeed been indications before 30 July of a possible increase in irregular arrivals. However, these warnings did not point to an event on the scale that ultimately unfolded.
This is precisely where the key difference between the two ministers’ accounts lies.
Between a general warning and a specific prediction
The two statements do not necessarily contradict each other completely. Marlaska acknowledges that there had already been information ahead of 30 July indicating a possible increase in irregular migration. A significant rise in attempted crossings had already been recorded, for example. According to earlier figures, around 500 attempts were recorded between 29 June and 12 July, while approximately 1,300 were recorded between 13 and 26 July.
The key issue, therefore, is how specific the CNI’s information actually was on 29 July. If the intelligence service merely knew that people were organising via social media to attempt to enter Ceuta, that would be very different from a specific warning of a mass movement involving tens of thousands of people.
Robles argues that the CNI shared the information it had received. Marlaska, however, says there was no report that foresaw the true scale of what ultimately happened.
Tens of thousands of people arrived in Ceuta
The scale of the events on 30 and 31 July was extraordinary. According to figures later provided by the Interior Ministry, around 72,000 people entered Ceuta irregularly across the border. Marlaska also said in early August that around 70,000 people had already returned to Morocco.
The scale of the influx was therefore significantly greater than during the migration crisis of 2021. Spanish authorities subsequently massively increased their presence in the city. Police, the Guardia Civil and the military were deployed to bring the situation under control. The number of arrivals subsequently fell sharply.
Why was there no stronger response?
This very question is likely to become a central focus of the parliamentary investigation. If it is confirmed that the CNI had already passed on specific indications of an impending large-scale operation on 29 July, the question then arises as to what measures were taken in response.
Robles stresses that the information was shared and analysed. Marlaska, by contrast, points out that although the authorities had expected an increase in migration, they had not anticipated a movement involving tens of thousands of people within such a short period of time.
The government had therefore already sent additional Guardia Civil personnel to Ceuta before the crisis. However, this reinforcement proved insufficient given the actual scale of the events.
Robles apologises to the people of Ceuta
During her hearing, Robles also acknowledged shortcomings on the part of the government and apologised to the people of Ceuta if they had felt abandoned by the Spanish state. She stressed that she understood the fear and uncertainty felt by local residents.
At the same time, the minister firmly defended Spain’s sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla. Both cities were Spanish and would remain so.
What did the government know about the social media posts?
Calls made on social media appear to have played an important role in the crisis. People were urged to take part in a coordinated action to reach Ceuta. Spanish security authorities had already registered indications of this before 30 July. Robles therefore pointed out that the migration movement had not come as a complete surprise. At the same time, she stressed that its actual scale could not have been predicted.
The decision by Spain’s Supreme Court not to automatically turn back people who reach Ceuta or Melilla by swimming also played a role in the debate. Marlaska had already said in early August that this ruling, together with the usual seasonal increase in migration, had been taken into account.
Government establishes central command structure for Ceuta
The crisis has now also had concrete political consequences. The Spanish government wants to centralise the coordination of the situation in Ceuta more closely in the future. To this end, a so-called “mando único”, or unified command structure, is to be established.
Ceuta is also to be designated as an area of particular interest for national security. The government is also planning further measures to support the city and manage the migration situation. At the same time, the government is working on changes to Spain’s asylum and immigration laws.
The dispute within the government is likely to continue
The conflict between Robles and Marlaska is therefore unlikely to be over. The parliamentary investigation into the events will continue in the coming days, with Marlaska also due to address the crisis before Congress. This is likely to raise the question once again of what information the Spanish authorities actually had before 30 July.
For the government of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, the dispute is politically sensitive. If it emerges that concrete information about an impending mass movement was available but did not lead to adequate security measures, the government could come under considerable pressure.
If, on the other hand, it is confirmed that there were general warnings of an increase in migration but no reliable forecast of a mass arrival involving tens of thousands of people, this would support Marlaska’s account.
What was communicated on 29 July is crucial
The central dispute therefore comes down to one question: What exactly did the CNI know on 29 July – and what information was passed on to the relevant authorities?
Robles says the intelligence service issued a warning and shared its findings with the security forces. Marlaska, however, says there was no report that predicted the events of 30 July on anything like their actual scale. The question, therefore, is not simply whether there was a warning. What matters is how specific that warning was and what action was taken as a result.
The upcoming parliamentary hearings could therefore prove crucial in determining whether this was indeed a case of inadequate preparation, or an extraordinary development whose true scale could not have been foreseen even by Spain’s intelligence services.
One thing is clear: the dispute between two key ministers in the government has made the political reckoning over the Ceuta crisis considerably more contentious.
